How to Monitor Workers' Use of IT Without Becoming Big Brother
CIOs asked to monitor employees' use of corporate IT are entering a difficult area for managers, as recent litigation shows. Here's how to do it right.
The ROI of Privacy
In conversations with CIOs, Forrester’s Kark says
he’s discovered that most companies “don’t
want to put in draconian measures tfo say that [their company]
is going to monitor everything, even though they have the right
to do so.” In those companies that create cultures with
more user-friendly privacy measures, Kark says that he’s
found that there’s a higher level of trust among users
and management.
According to Zweig’s research, monitoring “continues to violate the basic psychological boundaries between the employer and employee—one that is predicated on some minimal level of privacy, autonomy and respect. Once this boundary has been violated, a host of negative implications are likely, ranging from dissatisfaction and stress to resistance and deviance.” Therefore, he says, it’s critical for a company that wants to engender a culture of collaboration and trust to make it perfectly clear to all employees both inside and outside IT, just what IT will and, more important, will not do. “It should be communicated to everyone in the organization that the IT department does not have carte blanche,” Zweig says. “It isn’t open season on people.”
How to Monitor the Monitors
And that brings us back to the IT department—those
entrusted with the access, know-how and a front-row seat on all
the monitoring action. In organizations where there is
“open season” on employees’ digital wakes,
CIOs and analysts say there’s usually an unregulated
“cowboy culture” within the IT department and, most
likely, little trust and respect between management and users.
In such organizations, Forrester’s Kark says he finds
that more IT employees have access to a system than is actually
appropriate. At one company, for example, he determined that 32
employees (including the CIO) had access to a very sensitive
area of the company’s systems when, in fact, only three
people actually needed the access to do their jobs; the other
29 were superfluous and therefore potential risks. Kark calls
that situation “typical.”
Even though anyone with PC access can wreak havoc on your systems, research from a CERT Insider Threat study shows that technology sabotage almost always comes from within the IT ranks. In 49 incidents of IT-enabled sabotage examined, 86 percent of the perpetrators held technical positions, and 90 percent of them had been granted administrator or privileged system access when they were hired.
“I worry about the trusted person,” says Credit Suisse’s Sanzone. “To run an organization like this you have many trusted individuals that have access to sensitive things as part of their job. Probably, your risk is as high or if not higher [with the trusted person] than with any other.”
surveillance



