So as the negotiations commenced, these two "immovable policies," as Duncan terms it, were in direct conflict with each other. One side would have to blink first.

Getting Oracle to Yes

Going in, members of the bank's IT team knew the warranty and indemnity issues would be a possible deal-breaker. So the team assembled a couple of "carrots" to sweeten the deal on its end to get the deal moving.

First, however, came the sticks.

The bank's lead negotiator was clear from the outset that the bank would not budge from its demand that it must have a warranty for the software. The negotiator also made it known that the bank had realistic alternatives to awarding Oracle its business.

"The IT sourcing director had to convince Oracle that his alternatives—to choose another vendor or to cancel the project—were not negotiating ploys," writes Jones. "He told the Oracle rep on day one that the bank had an immovable policy on this point and held that position throughout further discussions until the Oracle sales team got the message."

Then came the carrots. The bank showed Oracle that it was interested in a long-term relationship worth several million dollars. This lure proved to be a "substantial incentive" to Oracle because of the size and scope of the deal; it also was a smart negotiating tactic on the bank's part, Jones says.

The bank also didn't shrink from a big purchase if Oracle agreed to the deal. The bank's IT sourcing director "ensured that the bank did not start the program prematurely with a small order, thinking it could resolve commercial details later," Jones writes. "It, instead, offered a substantial initial purchase plus further commitments, subject to the complete contract being agreed, to give Oracle the assurance it needed before it could agree to such significant concessions."

And lastly, members of the bank's team did their due diligence to understand Oracle's bargaining position, specifically where Oracle could give in, in each phase of the negotiations, Jones notes.

"The bank wanted several other concessions that had no impact on revenue recognition and were, therefore, relatively easy to get," he writes. For example, the bank couldn't allow Oracle the right to conduct license audits, due to confidentiality reasons, and it was able to remove the "right to audit" clause. Oracle, Jones writes, "knew from experience that other vendors had agreed to remove the audit clause with minimal resistance once the rationale was explained to them."