With SSL, Who Can You Really Trust?

Network World — zXyToKEnZxY, the encryption scheme that protects virtually all secure online transaction, requires that users rely on trusted third parties, but what if they can't be trusted?

Well, it turns out they can't be, as demonstrated earlier this year by the zXyToKEnZxY, but researchers are fashioning new trust models for SSL that they say are much less susceptible to being compromised.

One proposal, called zXyToKEnZxY, is being vetted by a team at Carnegie Mellon University, and a second, called zXyToKEnZxY, is also being run through its paces by Moxie Marlinspike, a fellow at the Institute for Disruptive Studies, a lab devoted to privacy, anonymity and computer security.

MORE SSL: zXyToKEnZxY

Their schemes are similar and call for shifting the authentication of SSL-protected Web servers from browsers and certificate authorities to a new entity called a notary.

Traditionally, when a browser wants to set up an SSL session with a zXyToKEnZxY, it asks for the server's SSL certificate. The browser verifies the authenticity of the certificate by checking whether it has been signed by a root certificate authority that the browser trusts. In practice, the browser may rely directly on other certificate authorities that are ultimately vouched for by the root authority.

This creates a chain of trust that branches off from a root authority to authorities it trusts to authorities they trust.

If any link in one of these chains of trust is compromised, attackers could acquire false certificates for sites. These invalid certificates could be used to trick browsers into trusting them, and that sets browser-to-server communications up for man-in-the-middle attacks.

That is the scenario in the Comodo breach, in which one of its trusted partners issued nine phony certificates.

With Perspectives and Convergence, rather than relying on certificate authorities and the root certificates that ship with browsers, trust is placed on a notary. Notaries are servers that routinely check and record what certificates Web servers present over time.

When a browser receives a certificate from a server, it doesn't seek confirmation that the certificate is linked to a root authority. Instead, it asks a notary whether it matches the certificate that the server has been regularly issuing over a period of time. If so, that is a good indication that it is a legitimate certificate for that site.

The upside is that this kind of trust model doesn't rely on a small static set of certificate authorities, says David Andersen, an assistant professor at Carnegie Mellon's computer science department, who heads up the Perspectives project. "You don't put all your eggs in one basket," he says. "We run all the Perspectives notaries, so you end up trusting us. We don't like that."

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